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Religious Freedom and Women’s Health

Religious Freedom and Women’s Health — The Litigation
on Contraception
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, J.D.

H

ealth policy experts widely
agree that health care should
not merely be sickness care; rather, it should actively prevent disease and preserve wellness. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) contains an
entire chapter dealing with prevention and public health. The
ACA also improves private and
public insurance coverage of preventive care. One preventive care
requirement, however, has caused
a major headache for the Obama
administration. Indeed, it has provoked charges that the administration is waging “a war on religion.”
The ACA requires private insurers and group health plans
(except for “grandfathered” plans,
defined as those that existed at
the time the ACA became law and
have not significantly changed)
to cover preventive services without cost sharing by enrollees.
This provision does not list the
covered services, instead referencing the recommendations of
other federal agencies that deal
with prevention. It specifically
requires coverage of women’s
preventive care and screening
services “provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported
by the Health Resources and
Services Administration” (HRSA).
At HRSA’s request, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) identified
women’s preventive services that
should be covered.1 On August 1,
2011, HRSA released guidelines
based on the IOM’s recommendations. Among the services that
health plans and insurers must
cover are “all Food and Drug Administration–approved contraceptive methods.” Coverage must be
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available for plan years beginning
after August 1, 2012.
Requiring contraception coverage is not a radical innovation.
Twenty-eight states currently require insurers (with some exceptions) to cover contraceptives.2
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has also concluded that contraception coverage
is required by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, although federal
courts have come to contradictory conclusions on this question.
But contraception is considered
to be a “grave sin” by the Roman
Catholic church, and a number of
Protestant organizations object
specifically to “morning after”
contraceptives and intrauterine
devices, which they consider to
be abortifacients.
In final rules and guidance
issued in February 2012, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) recognized these
concerns. First, it excused from
compliance with the contraception
requirement “religious employers,”
defined to include churches and
other nonprofit entities that exist for the inculcation of faith and
primarily serve and hire adherents to a particular religious faith.
Second, it imposed a moratorium
until August 1, 2013, on the application of the requirement to
“religious organizations” — nonprofit entities such as universities, hospitals, or charities run
by religious groups that do not
limit the population they serve
and employ to adherents to their
religion. In March, the DHHS published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking committing itself to finding an approach that
n engl j med 368;1
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would ensure employees of religious organizations (and students
in religious universities) access to
contraception without requiring
the religious organizations to pay
for it. Such organizations might,
for example, be excused from
paying for contraception coverage
while the insurers that offer their
group plans covered contraceptives using the savings they accrued from not covering unplanned pregnancies.
This approach was not acceptable to organizations that object to contraception. Forty federal
lawsuits have been filed challenging the contraception policy.3 Most
have been filed by religious organizations that do not qualify for
the religious-employer exception.
A number, however, have been
filed by for-profit businesses
whose owners have personal religious objections to contraception. The governors of seven states
joined one lawsuit supporting the
religious-organization plaintiffs.
Although the claims in these
lawsuits are fundamentally
grounded in the right to religious freedom enshrined in the
First Amendment, they are not
primarily constitutional claims.
The Supreme Court decided more
than two decades ago that the First
Amendment does not prohibit a
“neutral law of general applicability” that burdens religious conduct.4 Rather, the litigation is
based primarily on the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which
Congress adopted in response to
that Supreme Court decision. This
Act prohibits the federal government from substantially burdening the free exercise of religion
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unless it establishes that a requirement “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and
“is the least restrictive means of
furthering” that interest.5
To date, district courts have
issued decisions in 11 cases (see
box), with more being decided
every week. The courts have dismissed as premature claims
brought by religious organizations in 6 cases. These organizations are still protected by the
moratorium and have therefore
not yet suffered an injury. Because the DHHS has not yet decided how it is going to handle
the religious-organization issue,
the dispute of these organizations
with the agency is not yet timely.
They can return to court once the
DHHS announces its final rule if
they are not satisfied. One court,
however, has held that religious
organizations are already injured
by the rule and can sue.
The cases brought by the secular employers are more problematic. District courts in three of these
cases have issued a temporary order prohibiting the federal government from forcing the employer to
comply with the contraception requirement while the court considers the case. One other court
has dismissed a secular-employer case on the merits, although
its decision has been stayed by a
federal appellate court. Another
court denied a preliminary injunction, holding that the employer was unlikely to succeed on its
legal claim.
One issue in the secularemployer cases is whether a private, secular, for-profit corporation can hold protected religious
beliefs. The Supreme Court has
held that corporations are protected by the First Amendment’s
freedom-of-speech provisions, but
corporations are not protected
by other constitutional provisions,
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Federal Court Cases Challenging the Preventive Services Mandate
of the Affordable Care Act.
• Courts have dismissed five cases brought by religious organizations that are covered by the current moratorium because their challenge is premature: State of
Nebraska v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, July 17, 2012);
Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
[D.D.C.], July 18, 2012); Wheaton College v. Sebelius (D.D.C. August 24, 2012);
Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee, November 21, 2012); Zubik v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, November 27, 2012).
• One court has permitted claims brought by some religious organizations to proceed: Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, December 4, 2012).
• One court has dismissed a claim brought by a for-profit employer as not stating
a legal claim: O’Brien v. United States Department of Health and Human Services
(U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, September 28, 2012).
A federal appeals court has stayed this decision (U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, November 28, 2012).
• In two cases brought by for-profit employers, the court has granted a preliminary
injunction blocking the enforcement of the mandate until the court can give the
case full consideration: Newland v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado, July 27, 2012); and Tyndale House Publishers v. Sebelius (D.D.C. Novem
ber 16, 2012).
• In one other case, the court granted a preliminary injunction to a for-profit employer
but denied relief to a religious-organization plaintiff that is protected by the moratorium: Legatus v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
October 31, 2012).
• In one other case, the court denied a for-profit corporation’s request for a preliminary injunction, finding that corporations did not have protected rights under the
Free Exercise Clause and that the individual plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of
success on their legal claim: Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius (U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma, November 19, 2012).

such as the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.
In one of the contraception cases, the court held that a secular,
for-profit corporation cannot hold
a religious belief. In other cases,
however, the courts have allowed
privately held corporations to assert the religious beliefs of their
individual owners. These decisions
run contrary to the general approach of the law, which refuses
to “pierce the corporate veil” separating corporations from their
owners.
Another issue is whether the
contraception requirement furthers a compelling governmental
interest and is the least restrictive
means of doing so. The government argues that the requirement
promotes a compelling interest in
public health, citing the IOM’s
conclusion that family planning
n engl j med 368;1
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provides health benefits for both
women and their children. It also
contends that the rule promotes
gender equity, freeing women
from a significant expense that
men do not incur and giving them
greater freedom to pursue their
life plans. Courts that have enjoined the enforcement of the requirement, however, have asked
why, if the interests the law promotes are compelling, it excludes
from protection millions of employees who are covered by grandfathered plans or who work for
religious employers or for small
employers (which are not required
to provide health insurance). One
court also suggested that the government’s goal could be achieved
through a public program instead
of employer coverage.
Perhaps the most interesting
question, however, is whether the
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requirement substantially burdens
the religious beliefs of employers.
Two courts have observed that the
rule does not require employers
to use contraceptives or even to
approve of their use. It asks the
employer only to make a benefit
available, which the employee
must then decide whether or not
to use. Employers object, however, that they should not have to
pay for services that they consider to be morally wrong. The
question of whose interests and

beliefs — those of the employer
or those of the employee — ought
to determine access to contraception benefits is one that the courts,
and no doubt ultimately the Supreme Court, will have to decide.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
From Washington and Lee University
School of Law, Lexington, VA.
This article was published on December 19,
2012, at NEJM.org.
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Shared Decision Making to Improve Care and Reduce Costs
Emily Oshima Lee, M.A., and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, M.D., Ph.D.

A

sleeper provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) encourages greater use of shared
decision making in health care.
For many health situations in
which there’s not one clearly superior course of treatment, shared
decision making can ensure that
medical care better aligns with
patients’ preferences and values.
One way to implement this approach is by using patient decision aids — written materials,
videos, or interactive electronic
presentations designed to inform
patients and their families about
care options; each option’s outcomes, including benefits and
possible side effects; the health
care team’s skills; and costs.
Shared decision making has the
potential to provide numerous
benefits for patients, clinicians,
and the health care system, including increased patient knowledge, less anxiety over the care
process, improved health outcomes, reductions in unwarranted variation in care and costs,
and greater alignment of care
with patients’ values.

6

However, more than 2 years
after enactment of the ACA, little
has been done to promote shared
decision making. We believe that
the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) should
begin certifying and implementing patient decision aids, aiming
to achieve three important goals:
promote an ideal approach to clinician–patient decision making,
improve the quality of medical
decisions, and reduce costs.
In a 2001 report, Crossing the
Quality Chasm, the Institute of Medicine recommended redesigning
health care processes according
to 10 rules, many of which emphasize shared decision making.
One rule, for instance, underlines
the importance of the patient as
the source of control, envisioning a health care system that encourages shared decision making
and accommodates patients’ preferences.
Unfortunately, this ideal is inconsistently realized today. The
care patients receive doesn’t always align with their preferences.
For example, in a study of more
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than 1000 office visits in which
more than 3500 medical decisions were made, less than 10%
of decisions met the minimum
standards for informed decision
making.1 Similarly, a study
showed that only 41% of Medicare patients believed that their
treatment reflected their preference for palliative care over more
aggressive interventions.2
There’s also significant variation in the utilization of procedures, particularly those for preference-sensitive conditions, which
suggests that patients may receive
care aligned not with their values
and preferences, but with their
physicians’ payment incentives.
Among Medicare patients in
more than 300 hospital regions,
the rate of joint-replacement procedures for chronic hip arthritis
varied by as much as a factor of
five, and the use of surgery to
treat lower back pain varied by
nearly a factor of six. Other studies have found wide regional variation in the treatment of early-stage
breast and prostate cancers and
in the use of cardiac procedures.
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